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INTRODUCTION: THE CORE IDEA

The current system of financing research and development ("R&D")
for new medicines is deeply flawed by the impact of high prices on access
to medicine, the wasteful spending on marketing and R&D for medically
unimportant products, and the lack of investment in areas of greatest public
interest and need. It can and should be replaced with something better.
The system for financing new drug development can be radically
improved-spending less overall, aligning investment incentives more
efficiently-while making drugs available to everyone at cheap generic
prices.
Reforming the way we pay for R&D on new medicines involves a
simple but powerful idea. Rather than give drug developers the exclusive
rights to sell products, the government would award innovators money:
large monetary "prizes" tied to the actual impact of the invention on
improvements in health care outcomes that successful products actually
deliver.
I.

BACKGROUND ON PRIZES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO MEDICAL

R&D

The idea of using prizes to stimulate innovation has a long history,'
but in recent years, prize mechanisms have drawn new interest as a superior

1. See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Investment Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research
Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 691 (1983); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for
Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele,
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001), previously published as
Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights (Harvard Law
School, Olin Ctr. Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 246, 1998); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is it the Best Incentive System? (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley
Working Paper E01-303, 2001); Paul Romer, When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?, AM.
ECON. REv., May 2002, at 213; Lee N. Davis, Should We ConsiderAlternative Incentives for Basic
Research? Patents vs. Prizes, Paper for the Druid Summer Conference on Industrial Dynamics,
Copenhagen, Denmark (June 2002); Michael Abramowicz, PerfectingPatentPrizes, 56 VAND. L. REv.
114 (2003); Benjamin Krohmal, Prominent Innovation Prizes and Reward Programs (KEI Research
Note 2007:1, 2007).
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business
model for the creation of medicines and some other knowledge
2
goods.
This has been motivated in part by developments in information
technologies, particularly the Internet, where vast knowledge goods and
services are available for free, on the margin. These examples, which have
been directly experienced and highly valued by millions of persons, are
leading to new examinations of how other knowledge goods, including
inventions of new drugs and vaccines, could be more widely shared.
In 2002, Aventis, the giant pharmaceutical firm, held a three-day
scenario planning session in Ottrott-le-Haut, France, to consider what
might happen if there were radical changes in the business models for new
drug development. The meeting.was authorized by the Aventis CEO and
the company's board of directors, and included more than two dozen highlevel Aventis executives and two critics of the existing regime of
2. Recent papers by Joseph Stiglitz on prizes have attracted considerable attention, including for
example, Joseph Stiglitz, Give Prizes Not Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, and Joseph Stiglitz.
Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize Fund Could Improve the Financing of Drug
Innovations, 333 BRITISH MED. J. 1279 (2006) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Scrooge]. In addition to papers
mentioned above, see James Love. From TRIPS to RIPS: A Better Trade Framework to Support
Innovation in Medical Technologies, Paper for the Workshop on Economic Issues Related to Access to
HtV/AIDS Care in Developing Countries, Agence nationale de recherches sur le Sida, Marseille,
France (May 27, 2003) [hereinafter Love, From TRIPS to RIPS]; Burton Weisbrod, Solving The Drug
Dilemma, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2003; James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare
R&D, Paper for Columbia University's Workshop on Access to Medicines and the Financing of
Innovations in Heath Care (Dec. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Love, A New Trade Framework]; James Love &
Tim Hubbard, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2/2 PLOS BIOLOGY 147 (2004)
[hereinafter Love & Hubbard, A New Trade Framework]; Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski,
Patents and R&D Incentives: Comments on the Hubbard and Love Trade Framework for Financing
Pharmaceutical R&D (June 25, 2004); Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What are the Issues?
(Ctr. Econ. & Policy Research Issue Paper, 2004); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for
Pharmaceutical Innovation (Jan. 17, 2005); Thomas W. Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A
Research Program, 1/2 METAPHILOSOPHY 182 (2005); 141 CONG. REC. E149 (Extension of Remarks
Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sanders on the medical innovation prize fund); Aidan Hollis, An
Optional Reward System for Neglected Disease Drugs (May 18, 2005); Thomas Pogge, A New
Approach
to
Pharmaceutical
Innovations,
ON
LINE OPINION,
June
21,
2005,
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3559 (last visited Sept. 27, 2007); James Love &
Tim Hubbard, Paying for Public Goods, in CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 207 (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005) [hereinafter Love & Hubbard, Paying]; James Love,
Medical Innovation Prize Fund System of Renumeration, in REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NONVOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 77-80, 101-04 (WHO UNDP 2005)
[hereinafter Love, Medical Innovation]; James Love, Measures to Enhance Access to Medical
Technologies, and New Methods of Stimulating Medical R&D, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679 (2007)
[hereinafter Love, Measures]; Scott Woolley, Prizes Not Patents, FORBES, Apr. 18, 2006; James Love,
A New Initiative at the WHO, Prizes Rather than Prices, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May 2006; James
Love, Drug Development Incentives to Improve Access to Essential Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 408 (2006); Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Lowand Middle-Income Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159 (2006); Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical
Innovation with Medical Need, 13 NATURE MED. 304 (2007); Marlynn Wei. Should Prizes Replace
Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. (working
paper 2007).
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incentives: Tim Hubbard, Head of Human Genome Research for the
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute and a leading proponent of placing
genome research in the public domain, and James Love, then as Director of
the Consumer Project on Technology and a proponent of compulsory
licensing of patents on medicines in developing countries.
One product of this meeting was initially dubbed "Radical IPR
Scenario # 1." It involved a proposal to eliminate marketing monopolies for
new pharmaceutical drugs, in return for a system of large cash prizes. In
order to ensure the entire world shared the costs of drug development, there
would be a global treaty that set minimum levels of support for R&D,
either through similar prizes funds or other research projects, including
open source research similar to the Human Genome Project.
When the Aventis scenario exercise concluded, some thought it
offered a superior and plausible alternative to the current systems of paying
for R&D for new medicines and could be translated into a broader global
campaign for access to medical inventions. The campaign would focus on
issues of fairness and economic efficiency. The new system was justified
on both moral and economic grounds.
II.

SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT "PRICE" INCENTIVE

It's not easy to summarize the complicated economics of the
pharmaceutical industry, but some basic facts are helpful to review.
According to the market research firm IMS, global sales for pharmaceutical
products were $602 billion in 2005, or 1.35 percent of global GDP. 3 Some
experts believe that the current system of market monopolies for drug sales
increased 2006 drug prices by $400 to $480 billion. In the United States
market, brand name products are on average twelve
times more expensive
4
than generics when purchased from manufacturers.

3.

IMS Health Reports Global Pharmaceutical Market Grew 7 Percent in 2005, to $602 Billion,

IMSHEALTH.COM, Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599
366577491316,00.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
4. In 2005, the United States market share for generic pharmaceutical products was 56 percent by
volume, but only 9 percent by sales. On average, generic manufacturers sold products at only 8 percent
of the price of branded products. Generic Pharmaceutical Association, http://www.gphaonline.org (last
visited Sept. 29, 2007). Prices to consumers, which reflect pharmacy mark-ups and other distribution
costs, have somewhat different relative prices, but still reflect large differences between patented and
generic prices. Price premiums for "brand name" trademarks for medicines are also higher largely
because of the long period of exclusive marketing rights, which associates the name of the product with
the trademark and presents entry barriers for generic products.
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The hefty price premiums for patented brand name products are
tolerated for one reason and one reason only: this is how we stimulate R&D
for new medicines.
A simple but often overlooked question is how much R&D do we get
for the price premium? The International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Associations ("IFPMA") claims that global private sector
investments in R&D were about $51 billion in 2005, 5 or less than 9 percent
of global sales. 6 This is what we get for the $400 to $480 billion in higher
prices. The patent system (as currently implemented) is a very expensive
way to stimulate R&D. Consumers pay eight or nine dollars in higher
prices to stimulate one dollar in R&D spending.
But what type of R&D does this buy? The granting of marketing
monopolies creates big incentives to develop products that have modest (if
any) medical benefits when compared to existing medicines. If marketed
heavily, such products can fetch high prices, so long as they are perceived
to be roughly as good as another high-priced medicine. In some cases,
products are simple reformulations of existing drugs, with only minor
benefits in drug delivery.
Among experts, it is well known that most new drugs are not very
important, because they don't offer significant improvements over existing
medicines and come at the cost of unknown adverse reactions that will only
emerge over time.
A recent study by the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
("CDER") found that of the 1,284 new drug approvals ("NDAs") from
1990 to 2004, only 289, or 22.5%, were for "priority" reviews, defined as a
product that presents a "significant improvement compared to marketed
products in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease." 7 Of the
priority products, 183 (14.3 percent of the total
NDAs) were classified by
8
the FDA as new molecular entities ("NMEs").
5. Eric Noehnrenberg, Director, Int'l Trade & Market Policy, Int'l Fed'n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs.
& Ass'ns, Statement on IGWG Agenda Item 2.3: "Elements of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action"
(Dec. 2006), available at http://www.ifpma.org/Events/WHO%201GWG%204%20-%208%20Dec%
202006/content/pdfs/IGWG I_IFPMAGlobalStrategy_05DecO6.pdf.
6. The United States trade association PhRMA often presents data that suggests higher rates of
investment in R&D. They are often misleading, because they don't take into account the fact that while
most of the global R&D spending occurs in the United States, products are sold globally. PhRMA
surveys systematically exclude R&D spending and sales by foreign subsidiaries of foreign
pharmaceutical companies and do not include revenues for non-PhRMA members.
7.

CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6020.3

(2007). The FDA classification is prospective designation, and a post-approval evaluation may indicate
proportions that are higher or lower.
8. Id.

CHICA GO-KENT LA W RE VIEW

[Vol 82:3

Not only are most new drug approvals for products not very important
medically, but the costs of drug development for the so called "me-too"
products are often more expensive. The largest costs for the development
of new drugs are for clinical trials involving humans. A recent study of
clinical trials by Love and Patel found that the number of patients enrolled
in clinical trials is almost twice as large for products that don't have
significant therapeutic benefits over existing drugs. This is not surprising.
Once regulators like the United States FDA determine that products have
few incremental benefits over existing medicines, they are likely to require
more proof that the products don't cause harm to patients. Companies also
need larger trials to claim that small differences in efficacy are statistically
significant.
The companies who sell the products also admit that they invest in
clinical trials that have little scientific value, largely for marketing
purposes. Eve Slater, as Merck's Senior President for Clinical Testing,
complained to the Wall Street Journal that post-marketing studies "are
billowing out of control," with "a total lack of science" in some studies.
When rivals offer studies that can be used to influence doctors and
9 patients
"you have to do it, too, or you are dead in the water," Slater said.
One measure of the lack of scientific relevance of many of the clinical
trials is found on the section of the FDA drug marketing label titled
"clinical trials." Weighted by the number of patients, the FDA cites less
than half of the clinical trials that companies report having undertaken, as
evidence to support the safety and efficacy of the products.
This is the current system of stimulating R&D. In 2005, prices were
$400 to $480 billion higher due to patent monopolies, in return for $51
billion in private sector R&D, and probably one-half to two-thirds of the
R&D investments were directed towards projects of almost no medical
significance.
What do these high prices do in terms of access? In a country with
comprehensive healthcare insurance, where all new medicines are available
through insurance, access would not suffer. Unfortunately, that does not
describe the world we live in.
The situation is direst in developing countries, where access to
medicines is often appalling. The World Health Organization's "essential
medicines list" ("EML") is limited to products that are "cost-effective."
9. Robert Langreth, Drug Marketing Drives Many Clinical Trials, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998,
at 1.
10. James Love & Julie Patel, Size of Clinical Trials for Priority and Non-priority Drug
Approvals (forthcoming).
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The most recent version of the list included only fourteen patented
products, eleven of which were for the treatment of AIDS, and only three
for all other diseases." AIDS drugs were only added to the list after
activists launched a campaign for compulsory licenses on patents for AIDS
drugs, and lobbied wealthy governments to fund the cost of treatment.
Major pharmaceutical companies routinely offer products in
developing countries at high prices, not because they are concerned about
re-importation to wealthy countries, but because the actual profitmaximizing prices are often those that target the elites who control the
most income. A 2004 study of the pricing of Merck's asthma drug Singular
found that it was only affordable for the wealthiest 10 percent of the South
African population, the group that also controlled about half the country's
income. Merck would have to decrease the price significantly to make the
product affordable to even the top 20 percent of the population, let alone
most people, and in doing so would have lower profits, even with more
units sold.
In a 2004 meeting at the World Bank, a Novartis executive said the
company considered India a country of 50 million potential customers,
including only the 5 percent of the population with incomes comparable to
Europeans. These stories are repeated all over the world, as illustrated by
well-known disputes, such as over the prices of the heart disease drug
Plavix in the Dominican Republic and Thailand, Pfizer's price of Norvasc
in the Philippines, Pfizer's fluconazole in Honduras, or Tamilfu for
government stockpiles, to mention only a few examples.12
Developing countries like Brazil and Thailand, with large populations
of AIDS patients, find their political will to provide treatment challenged
by the high prices for new second-line AIDS drugs, which eat up healthcare
budgets.
In developed economies the problems are less severe, but quite real.
The United States reportedly has more than 50 million persons without
health insurance, including many in the middle class, who face enormous
11. See Letter from James Love et. al to the WHO Expert Committee on the Selection and Use of
Essential Medicines (Mar. 2, 2007), available at http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com
_content&task=view&id=25.
12. Andrew Leonard,
Pfizer's Philippine Follies, SALON.COM,
Apr. 4, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/04/04/pfizer/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2007); Letter from
French embassy to Sr. Hugo Guiliani Cury, Secretary of State, Dom. Rep. (May 14, 2002), availableat
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/dr/ (regarding proposed compulsory license for patents on the heart
disease drug Plavix); see also Susanne Gelders, Margaret Ewen, Nakae Noguchi & Richard Laing,
Price, Availability and Affordability: An International Comparison of Chronic Disease Medicines,
WHO Doc. EM/EDB/068/E/05.06/3000 (2006).
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challenges when diagnosed with severe illnesses. Some United States
employers who provide insurance find ways to avoid hiring workers who
will likely need expensive drugs. Public and private insurance companies
everywhere try to limit access to some expensive new medicines. 13 Several
governments have been in difficult negotiations over the high price of
Gardasil, the new vaccine for the leading cause of cervical cancer. 14 In
many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") countries, reimbursements for very expensive drugs for cancer
and other severe illnesses are restricted to limited uses, or in some cases are
not available at all. 15
There are many other important issues concerning current mechanisms
to simulate R&D. For example:
Drug Resistance: New antibiotics are needed to combat resistance to
older drugs. But once they are developed, it is better if the drugs are only
used when the older drugs fail, to -reduce the risks of resistance to the new
medicines. On the other hand, companies that hold the patents on such
medicines have incentives to encourage product use in order to increase
sales. 16
13. See, e.g., Robert E. Wittes, Cancer Weapons, Out of Reach, WASH. POST, June 15, 2004, at
A23; Daniel Costello, Setting a Pricefor Putting off Death: A Few More Months of Life May Not Be
Worth the Costs of New Cancer Therapies, Some Argue, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at C 1.
14. Glaxo May Face Resistance to Reimbursement, Dow JONES, Nov. 9, 2006; Marie
McCullough, A Downside to HeraldedHPV Drug: Cost, Access, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2007, at Al
("The base price-S360 for three shots given over six months-makes it the most expensive of an evergrowing list of childhood vaccines. Private insurance coverage of Gardasil is in flux. Many physicians
are complaining about under-reimbursement. And for the uninsured, free or discounted vaccines are
very limited for women over 18."); Linda A. Johnson, Cancer Vaccine's Price, Insurance Problems
Limiting PatientAccess, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2007.
15. See supra note 14; see also James Love, AstraZeneca Tells New Zealand Cancer Patients
They Will Withdraw Cancer Drugfrom the Market to Protest Government Pressures to Lower Prices,
HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 18, 2005, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/astrazeneca-tells-newzea_b_12475.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2007); Deal Reached over CancerDrug, TVNZ.CO.NZ, Dec. 19,
2005, http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/411423/641296 (last visited Sept. 29, 2007); Reinhard Angelmar,
NICE or Nasty?, Access and Reimbursement of Multiple Sclerosis Medicines in the UK (INSEAD Case
Study 2006), available at http://knowledge.insead.edu/abstract.cfm?ct=16700; Roche: To Appeal UK
Nice Tarceva Reimbursement Finding, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, Mar. 9, 2007 ("The Basel-based
pharmaceutical company plans to appeal the U.K. National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence's, or NICE's, decision not to reimburse patients with lung cancer for Tarceva."); Stephen B.
Soumeral, Benefits and Risks of Increasing Restrictions on Access to Costly Drugs in Medicaid,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 135; Lars Ryd~n, Graham Stokoe, Gunter Breithardt, Fred
Lindemans & Adriaan Potgieter, PatientAccess to Medical Technology Across Europe, 25 EUR. HEART
J. 611 (2004). Stuart 0. Schweitzer & S. Renee Shiota, Access and Cost Implications of State
Limitations on Medicaid Reimbursementfor Pharmaceuticals,13 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 399 (1992).
16. Niklas Rudholm, Economic Implications of Antibiotic Resistance in a Global Economy, 21 J.
HEALTH ECON. 1071 (2002); Ramanan Laxminarayan & Gardner M. Brown, Economics of Antibiotic
Resistance: A Theory of Optimal Use, 42 J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 183 (2001); Ramanan
Laxminarayan, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Can Economic Incentives Play a Role?, RESOURCES,
Spring 2001, at 9.
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Delivery Systems: In many areas, products will be more useful if
delivery systems or storage characteristics are improved, or if medicines
are used as co-formulated products or "cocktails," such as ritonavir with
other protease inhibitors. Often these opportunities are discouraged by
restrictive licensing policies set by parties holding blocking patents.
PrescribingPractices: A system that focuses on market exclusivity
also suffers from over-investment in wasteful marketing activities, and
often from the irrational prescribing practices that such marketing efforts
promote. Company designs of clinical trials often avoid the types of
comparisons between drugs that would be most useful in designing rational
prescribing practices.
Special health problems that disproportionately impact the poor:
When marketing exclusivity is the reward, investors rationally target
research investments to address the problems of patients who have the
highest incomes and can pay the highest prices. The WHO's Commission
on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health ("CIPIH") used a
three-category classification of diseases. 17 Type I diseases are those for
which the burden is roughly the same everywhere, and there is a significant
market in high-income countries. Examples of Type I diseases would
include diabetes, heart disease, asthma, and most non-communicable
diseases. Type II diseases are those for which there is some disease burden
and market in high-income countries, but where most patients are lowincome persons living in low-income countries. Examples of Type II
diseases would include AIDS or tuberculosis. Type III diseases are those
that almost entirely afflict poor people living in poor countries. Examples
of Type III diseases would include malaria or Chagas' disease. The CIPIH
noted that under a system of incentives that targets prices (and incomes of
patients), there is considerable under-investment in Type II and III diseases
relative to need when measured on medical and social grounds, a problem
that is widely discussed in the public health literature and the subject
of
18
reports by periodic reports by the Global Forum for Health Research.

17. This was taken from the earlier report of the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health (CMH).
18. GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH 20032004 (2004); Patrice Trouiller, Piero Olliaro, Els Torreele, James Orbinski, Richard Laing & Nathan
Ford, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy
Failure, 359 LANCET 2188 (2002); Gavin Yamey, Editorial, The World's Most Neglected Diseases:
Ignored by the PharmaceuticalIndustry and by Public-PrivatePartnerships,325 BRITISH MED. J. 176
(2002); Hans Veeken & Bernard P&coul, Editorial, Drugs for 'Neglected Diseases': A Bitter Pill, 5
TROPICAL MED. & INT'L HEALTH 309 (2000).
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Public health experts also note the special problems of treating
patients in resource-poor settings, even for Type I diseases. For example,
the lack of heat-stabilized insulin for diabetes is an enormous problem for
patients living where reliable and convenient refrigeration is not available.

III. PRIZE SYSTEMS TO SIMULATE INVESTMENTS IN MEDICAL
INNOVATION
Economists have long seen prizes as a possible alternative to systems
of exclusive marketing rights. In recent years, work on prizes was an
academic backwater, seen more as a novelty than an important policy
option. It was more than a decade after Brian Wright's widely read 1983
paper in the American Economic Review19 that academic economists begin
to display much interest in prizes. But by the late 1990s, as the impact of
the Internet and other new business models began to shake the technology
sector, interest in new business models for knowledge goods began to
grow.
Prizes are an appealing answer to a thorny dilemma. How can society
ensure that knowledge goods, which are both costly to create and
potentially "non-rival" in use, be shared freely? The patent system is a
government intervention that makes a compromise. Inventors are given
temporary legal monopolies. Goods are not shared for a period of time, and
then they enter the public domain. The prize system is a way of rethinking
the problem. If you can divorce the incentive for innovation from the
product's price to consumers, knowledge goods, including the R&D for a
new medicine, can be placed in the public domain immediately.
But if prizes replace prices as the relevant incentive, who determines
the amount of the prize? This has been the major drawback to the use of the
prize system. In many areas of the economy, there is a reluctance to
abandon a system of prices determined by actual market transactions as the
method of determining the value of the knowledge good.
Many of the academic papers on prizes focused on this problem,
devising a variety of mechanisms and rules for setting the value of prizes,
often seeking to mimic the outcomes of market transactions. For example,
Michael Kremer's 1998 paper on patent buy-outs proposed a voluntary
2
system for buying out patent rights by using auctions to determine values. b

19.
20.

Wright, supra note 1.
Kremer, supra note I.
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Kremer soon began to focus on problems of R&D for medicines for
diseases that primarily concern the poor, like malaria. But rather than a
system of prizes or patent buy-outs, he called for large, government-funded
programs to buy products at high prices. Kremer's proposals for "advanced
purchase commitments" or "advanced marketing commitments" were
designed to address the problem of the poor not being able to pay the high
prices for the drugs and to tie the purchases to plans for delivering the
products to patients. They were strictly voluntary and did not seek to place
inventions into the public domain. By maintaining the ability of drug
developers to obtain high prices for products and control the patent rights,
Kremer, Jeffrey Sachs, and others were able to gain the support of the
Gates Foundation and large pharmaceutical companies, groups that were
anxious to show that tough intellectual property rules were consistent with
development.
In May 2001 in Montreux, the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development ("WBCSD") organized the first of two meetings
between industry, academics, and NGOs to discuss intellectual property
rights in biotechnology and healthcare. This meeting sparked interest in
new business models for drug development, including the use of prize
funds, as well as other approaches to supporting "open source" medicines.
The WBCSD effort led to the September 2002 Aventis scenario-planning
exercise in Ottrott-le-Haut, on "Pharma Scenarios for Sustainable
Healthcare," referred to above, where Tim Hubbard and James Love
presented Radical IP Scenarios #1 and #2. At the heart of the proposals
were two ideas.
The trade framework should no longer focus on standardized rules of
minimum levels of intellectual property protection (such as the WTO
TRIPS agreement and various WTO accession commitments, and bilateral
and regional intellectual property trade agreements) or drug prices (such as
the 1993 U.S./Thailand, 1999 U.S./E.U./Korea, or 2005 U.S./Australia
agreements on pharmaceutical prices). Instead, the focus would be on
agreements between countries to support investments in R&D; providing a
more flexible system for addressing the "free rider" issue that would
recognize the value of different approaches, including both public and
private sector investments; and "open" and "closed" science projects. In the
2002 proposal for the development of medicines, this would be closely tied
to a country's GDP.
The primary "pull" incentive for private investment would no longer
be the prospect of a marketing monopoly, but rather a system of prizes that
rewarded the impact of the inventions on healthcare inventions. There
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would be a "separation" of the markets for the products and innovation.
Innovations would enter the public domain, but innovators would profit
when the inventions provided benefits to patients.
There was also work on proposals for new "competitive
intermediaries" funded by mandatory employer/employee contributions to
provide money for various open science projects. These intermediaries
would be similar to venture capital funds, but would target investments in
projects that yielded scientific rather than financial returns. Employers
would be required to contribute, but would also be given the freedom to
choose to which intermediaries they would give money. Proponents of this
approach argue that employers would rationally target intermediaries that
invested in the most promising advances in medical science, even when the
investments were directed at basic or translational research, rather than
final products.
Beginning in late 2002, the new paradigm proposals were presented at
dozens of seminars and meetings, and were the subject of a Rockefellerfunded Bellagio series of meetings, as well as at three meetings at
Columbia organized with Jeffrey Sachs and2 2Joseph Stiglitz, and the main
ideas were published in a number of papers.
The initial reaction to the Aventis scenarios was positive but
somewhat skeptical within the public health community, and largely
negative among major pharmaceutical companies. However, interest in the
proposals began to grow 23 when academic economists began to publish
similar ideas ; the major pharmaceutical companies began to mount
attacks on the proposals; DiMasi and Grabowski, well known academic
authors and industry advisors, co-authored a critique 25; and a United
26 States
ideas.
the
discuss
not
to
WHO
the
asked
official
health
government
In 2004, economist Aidan Hollis approached KEI (CPTech at that
time) to explore ways to implement a system of prizes linked to health
21. Love & Hubbard, Paying,supra note 2, at 211-12.
22. Love, From TRIPS to RIPS, supra note 2; Love, A New Trade Framework, supra note 2; Tim
Hubbard & Jamie Love, Medicines Without Barriers,NEW SCIENTIST, June 14, 2003; Tim Hubbard &
James Love, We're Patently Going Mad: Lifesaving Drugs Must Be DevelopedDifferently-for All Our
Sakes, GUARDIAN, Mar. 4, 2004, at Science 6; Love & Hubbard, A New Trade Framework, supra note
2; Love & Hubbard, Paying,supra note 2; Love, Medical Innovation, supra note 2, at 77-80, 101-04;
Love, Measures, supra note 2.
23. Dean Baker was advocating a different approach that involved government-funded drug
development companies, which he claimed was superior the prize fund approach. Baker, supra note 2.
24. Weisbrod, supra note 2.
25. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 2.
26. Letter from William Steiger, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, to the Honorable J.W.
Lee, M.D., Director-General, World Health Org. (Oct. 30, 2003).
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outcomes in a limited and voluntary fashion, focusing on R&D for
neglected diseases. 'While recognizing the interest in exploring more
limited applications of the prize fund approach, our preference was to focus
attention on the possibility of a more radical change, targeting not only
problems of so-called "Type 11 and I1I" diseases, but as a model for any
disease and any country, including in particular the United States market,
which is the most important in the world, and not as a voluntary system,
but as a new incentive system that would replace government-imposed
marketing monopolies.
In January 2005, Hollis and political scientist Thomas Pogge
separately published papers that presented proposals for voluntary prize
funds, and Congressman Bernard Sanders introduced an ambitious, nonvoluntary prize fund system in the27United States Congress based upon the
Hubbard/Love/CPTech proposals.
On February 24, 2005, 162 leading scientists, academic law
professors, economists, NGOs, members of parliaments, government
officials and others wrote the WHO Executive Board and CIPIH to request
that they evaluate a proposal for a New Global Medical R&D Treaty. 28 The
February 24, 2005, proposal was ambitious, offering a complete alternative
to the exiting trade framework involving TRIPS and TRIPS-plus measures
on intellectual property rights and drug prices. In addition to creating new
global minimum requirements to support medical R&D, it created a system
of identifying and rewarding investments in priority research, open
research, technology transfer, 29and the preservation and dissemination of
traditional medical knowledge.
With respect to new incentives based upon prizes, Hollis proposed
rewards for inventions that treated neglected diseases, with the amount of
the rewards determined by the supply of innovations that improved Quality
Adjusted Life Years ("QALYs") in a competition for a fixed prize fund, an
approach similar to the one being proposed for a bill in the United States
Congress by Representative Sanders.
Pogge proposed an international agreement that would be an openended commitment to reward QALYs at a fixed rate or dollar per QALY,
27. H.R. 417, 109th Cog. (2005).
28. Letter to World Health Assembly Executive Board & World Health Org. Comm'n on
Intellectual Property, Innovation & Health (Feb. 24, 2005); Andrew Jack, WHO Members Urged to
Sign Kyoto-style Medical Treaty, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, available at
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/67e 10ffS-86d4-1 I d9-8075-00000e251 I c8.html.
29. One novel and controversial aspect of the proposal was the creation of a system of tradable
credits for investments in these projects, influenced in part by suggestions from Columbia economist
Joshua Zivin, then with the Council of Economic Advisors.
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an approach that we had rejected because of the difficulty of independently
determining rates for QALYs and the uncertainty of budget outlays. Like
Hollis, Pogge's proposal was voluntary, and innovators could choose to
protect inventions as monopolies rather than participate in the prize
program. Unlike Hollis, Pogge's proposal was not limited to particular
diseases.
On January 26, 2005, Representative Bernard Sanders (now a Senator
from Vermont) introduced H.R. 417 in the 109th Congress under the title
of the Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act. Sanders based his bill on the
proposals championed by Hubbard and Love. H.R. 417 was the first
practical illustration of how a prize fund would operate, and it was the most
ambitious. It had a budget, initially set at 0.5 percent of the United States
GDP, and a management structure. It addressed a number of practical
issues. These are some highlights:
H.R. 417 does not do away with the patent system. Innovators can still
get patents, and use patents to protect inventions, up until the point when a
product is registered for sale. At that point, however, rewards for the
invention from the prize fund replace the exclusive rights of patent as the
incentive mechanism. In effect, it changes the way the patent system works
and provides a new system of intellectual property incentives.
H.R. 417 was not a strict "QALY" proposal. A management structure
would administer the prizes under a set of general rules, including
consideration of the following:
* The number of patients who benefit from a drug, biological
product, or manufacturing process including (in cases of global
neglected diseases, global infectious diseases, and other global
public health priorities) the number of non-United States patients.
* The incremental therapeutic benefit of a drug, biological product,
or manufacturing process, compared to existing drugs, biological
products, and manufacturing processes available to treat the same
disease or condition.
• The degree to which the drug, biological product, or manufacturing
process addresses priority health care needs, including
o current and emerging global infectious diseases;
o severe illnesses with small client populations (such as
indications for which orphan designation has been granted
under section 526 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act3°); and
30.

21 U.S.C. § 360bb (2000).
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neglected diseases that primarily afflict the poor in
developing countries.
* Improved efficiency of manufacturing processes for drugs or
biological processes.
Companies who registered new medicines with the United States FDA
would compete for rewards by providing evidence that inventions benefit
patients, as measured by improved health outcomes.
The rewards would be paid annually, over a ten-year period of time
(because information about the safety and efficacy of new medicines
emerges over time).
In cases where a new invention is based upon an earlier invention,
H.R. 417 allows for sharing of rewards, so that a follow-on invention may
completely replace an existing medicine, but the earlier product could still
receive prize money, even with a zero market share, if the second product
was based upon its technology. The aim is to give the correct incentives for
products that are both first- and second-movers, since both are important.
In the next version, the prize fund will seek to address the issue of
products that are registered at nearly the same time, an issue raised by Dean
Baker in discussions on the bill.
The amount of the reward for a particular drug would be determined
by supply and demand. The size of the prize fund constitutes the "demand"
for innovations. Companies (or non-profit developers) would enter the
market to supply such innovations so long as the expected returns (the
expected share of the prize fund rewards) are greater than the expected
R&D costs.
The size of the prize fund is important, and the basic structure of H.R.
417 accommodates changes in views concerning the needed magnitude of
incentives. If the government wants to stimulate more private investment in
R&D, it can increase the size of the prize fund administratively, for
example, from 50 basis points to 70 or 100 basis points of GDP. The
amount of private investment in R&D thus becomes a matter of public
policy. The size of the prize fund can be increased or decreased, and it has
nothing to do with the price of the products themselves.
The policy-making board has the authority to determine many of the
details of the prize-fund reward system later, within certain parameters. As
noted, rewards would be based upon evidence that inventions provide
"incremental" benefits. No "single drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process" could receive more than five percent of the total
rewards in any given year. There were also certain "set-asides" for special
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public health problems or needs. These included the following initial
minimum allocations:
* 4 percent for global neglected diseases;
* 10 percent for orphan drugs; and
0 4 percent for global infectious diseases and other global public
health priorities, including research on AIDS, AIDS vaccines, and
medicines for responding to bio-terrorism.
The break in the link between the price of the product and the reward
to the drug developer has many benefits, including the following:
" Patients who need drugs and third parties that pay for medicines
through insurance would no longer restrict access to medicines
because of high prices. Formularies for medicines would no longer
be based upon drug prices, but rather the medical qualities of the
medicines.
* Like in India for more than thirty years, drug manufactures would
be able to sell any product. They would no longer have incentives
to manufacture and sell inferior medicines.
* By removing legal monopolies, companies that are efficient and
have a good reputation for quality would have an edge.
* Incentives for marketing would be radically changed. Marketing of
a product like Vioxx to patients who did not need the drug, as was
done by Merck, would not be profitable, because the prizes would
only reward incremental health care benefits. Marketing could also
not move the price for the product itself because of competition
among generic suppliers. Only evidence of benefits would generate
rewards, making it less profitable to market medicines as if they
are fashion accessories or magic potions.
IV. MAJOR ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF PRIZE FUNDS

There are a number of important issues in the design of a prize fund.
Many of these are usefully discussed in Steven Shavell and Tanguy van
Ypersele's influential 1998 and 2001 papers on prizes, 3 1 as well
as in the
32
growing literature of economists and law professors on prizes.
31. Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 1.
32. Lee Davis, Intellectual Property Rights, Strategy and Policy, 13 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW
TECH. 399 (2004); Lee Davis & Jerome Davis, How Effective Are Prizes as Incentives to Innovation?
Evidence from Three 20th Century Contests, Paper for the Druid Summer Conference on Industrial
Dynamics, Innovation and Development, Elsinore, Denmark (2004); Abramowicz, supra note 1;
Romer, supra note 1; Davis, supra note 1; Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 1; Steve P. Calandrillo, An
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of
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A.

Voluntary or Non-voluntary?

Love and Hubbard have argued for a non-voluntary replacement of
prizes for marketing monopolies, but have also considered the possibility of
voluntary mechanisms in the recent deliberations in the WHO's
Intergovernmental Working Group "IGWG") on Intellectual Property
Rights, Innovation and Public Health.
Hollis and Pogge have proposed voluntary prize mechanisms largely
because they believe such mechanisms would be politically appealing to
the existing pharmaceutical industry, which could choose between
monopoly profits and the prize reward system. 34 Some have even proposed
that prizes be a supplement rather than replacement for marketing
monopolies.
The differences between the voluntary and non-voluntary systems are
most significant in cases where existing markets are large, such as for type
I diseases, in OECD countries. For Type III and some Type II diseases, or
for innovations that adapt medicines for resource-poor settings, a strong
prize system might be the only significant reward for innovators in
developing countries.
Voluntary prize mechanisms would also be the most expensive, since
companies could opt for the larger sum between monopoly profits or the
prizes, or in some proposals, for both. In such situations the result would
either be high prices or larger prizes to encourage the adoption of prizes
rather than monopoly profits. Voluntary mechanisms also do not address
many well-known pricing abuses and access problems if the patent owner
chooses the monopoly over the prize. For these reasons, the non-voluntary
option will provide greater benefits and likely generate more support from
the persons who actually pay for medicines (consumers, employers,
insurers, governments).
B.

Relationship to the PatentSystem

The prize system is often presented to the public as an alternative to
the patent system, but it need not be. In many of the proposals for voluntary
prize mechanisms, patent owners effectively choose whether or not to
license patents for the uses tied to the prize payments. In some proposals,
Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward
System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998).
33. James Love, Submission of CPTech to IGWG (Nov. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.who.intiphi/public-hearings/first/1 5Nov06JamesLoveCPTech.pdf.
34. Hollis also considers making the voluntary prizes an alternative to tough price controls.
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prizes would simply supplement the benefits of strong patent protection
and not replace the patent monopoly. 35 Other proposals would have prizes
coexist with a weaker patent system. An example of the later is H.R. 417
from the 109th Congress, a legislative proposal by Bernard Sanders to
create a Medical Innovation Prize Fund in the United States. H.R. 417 did
not eliminate patents on medicines, but once the FDA approves products,
the patent would no longer prevent generic competition for the patented
invention. Inventors would effectively use patents to make claims on the
prize fund, rather than to create monopolies for products. But H.R. 417 did
not limit the prize fund payments to only patented inventions. Any new
product would qualify, including one that was developed without patents,
such as paclitaxel, the unpatented cancer drug developed by the National
Institutes of Health.
C. Fixed Total Prize Fund Obligations,or Obligation to Pay Fixed Prize
Per QAL Y?
Hubbard and Love, as well as Hollis, proposed fixed prize funds with
payments divided among innovators on the basis of the relative merits of
each innovation. Pogge proposed a fixed payment per QALY, with an
open-ended obligation to pay for prizes.
There are three major reasons why we support the fixed total prize
fund approach: First, it provides greater ability to control and predict
government budget outlays. This is a major issue for the governments that
will have to pay the-prizes. Second, by fixing the size of the prize fund, the
marginal cost of using an innovation is zero, since it does not change the
annual budget for the prize payments. This is essential for the elimination
of price-sensitive medical formularies. Third, by fixing the size of the prize
fund, the developers of products will have an incentive to lobby for fair and
efficient methods of valuing inventions. If too much money is given to one
inventor, prizes available for everyone else are smaller.
D. Structure of Prizes (and Relationship to QAL Ys)
Hollis and Pogge propose a strictly proportional link to QALYs as the
standard for measuring benefits and allocating prize fund awards. The flaw
of this is that it over-rewards products with very large QALYs at the
expense of other valuable products with much lower QALYs. We believe
35. This is a possibility that seems to be suggested by Stiglitz in his BMJ article. See Stiglitz,
Scrooge,supra note 2.
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rewards should partly but not exclusively be linked to QALYs to ensure the
development of a broader range of products and to address other R&D
objectives.
First, how would a strictly proportional QALY payout work? In the
Hollis formulation, if three drug developers were responsible for 1,000;
2,000; and 7,000 QALYS, the total number of QALYs would be 10,000
and the shares of the fund would be divided as follows: 1,000/ 10,000 = 0.1;
2,000/10,000 = 0.2; and 7,000/10,000 = 0.7.

We prefer a system where the administrators of a prize fund have the
flexibility to consider different36 approaches, rather than only one that is
strictly proportional to QALYs.
Larger QALYs are associated with both the efficacy of the products
and the number of patients who use them. Diseases like breast cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, and asthma have very large patient populations. Some
diseases or conditions have very few patients. In the current market,
governments and private insurers are willing to pay higher prices for
products that have relatively small client populations, such as the high
prices paid for Gleevec (ST1571) or Ceredase (Alglucerase), medicines
used to treat diseases classified as "orphans" by the United States FDA.
The arguments for paying higher prices for products with smaller
client populations are several, including the fact that the costs of drug
development are normally not strongly tied to the size of the potential
market. There are also benefits in having new medicines on the market
because they may later be used for new indications, as has been the case for
medicines such as AZT (originally developed for cancer, now used for
AIDS), Viagra (originally developed for heart disease, now used to
enhance erections), or ritonavir (originally developed as a standalone
protease inhibitor, now used as a booster of protease inhibitors).
It is possible to simulate prize fund payments and development costs
to better understand the consequences of different reward designs. For a
simple example, consider a world where the risk-adjusted cost of drug
36. The approaches used can also be transparent and predictable, although the issue of
predictability has to be placed into perspective. In a world with strong exclusive rights and prices
completely unfettered by government regulation, patent owners still face considerable uncertainty,
given the well-known risks that unanticipated averse effects or the emergency of superior alternatives
will reduce demand for products. And methodologies for government reimbursement programs that
involve impendent evaluation of the value of medicines are also constantly being changed in response
to lobbying by right-owners and new thinking by academic researchers and policy makers. Add to this,
the stochastic nature of the R&D process itself. These risks are not by themselves problematic, if capital
markets are efficient, and if investors believe that the overall level of funding will be large rather than
small.
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development is fixed at $200 million, the size of the prize fund is $2
billion, and there are five potential candidates for R&D, expecting to yield
1,000; 2,000; 3,000; 7,000 and 25,000 QALYs. If the prizes were allocated
with a strictly proportional payout per share of QALYs, as proposed by
Hollis and Pogge, only two the projects would be brought to market. If the
prize fund were allocated half on the basis of QALYs and half for bringing
a new product for market, all five projects would be brought to market.
Table 1
Two prize payments methods compared
2,000 prize fund, 200 fixed R&D cost

QALYs
(000)
Projects

Totals

Rewards
Proportional
to QALYs
53
1
105
2
158
3
368
7
1,316
25
38

Prize Payments
Rewards
Proportional
to QALYs
(only feasible
projects)

2,000

Halfallocated
proportional
to QALYs, half
for successful
new drugs
226
253
279
384
438
858
1,563

2,000

2,000

The above is just a simple illustration of a prize fund structure that
levels out the rewards somewhat, giving relatively larger prizes to the
projects associated with fewer QALYs and less to projects with more
QALYs, which could ensure that more projects are undertaken.3 7 In the real
world, it is much more complicated to model. Risk-adjusted costs are
themselves a function of the expected payoffs (companies will take larger
gambles or spend more on known risks if the expected payoffs are higher),
for example, but the basic point is quite important. The fact that we
currently accept much higher prices for products with smaller client
populations provides some evidence that the market itself seeks to
accommodate the issue of high fixed-development costs.
37. For a different view, see Posting of Aidan Hollis
http://www.cptech.org/blogs/drugdevelopment/atom.xml (July 08, 2006).

to
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More sophisticated modeling is possible for the relationship to R&D
costs and QALYs and also for consideration of other approaches, such as
option pricing models, to address the valuation of new antibiotics or
products developed for potential health threats, such as medicines and
vaccines for avian flu, SARS, or bio-terrorism.
Some issues of prize-fund design can also be addressed through
instruments like caps on shares given to any one product, or set-asides for
special categories of medicines, approaches already incorporated in H.R.
417.
E.

Timing of Payoff

It is very difficult to know what the benefits of a product will be when
it is first placed on the market. We recommend prizes be paid out over
time, as more is known about utilization, safety, and efficacy of products.
The Sanders bill uses a ten-year period for evaluation, with payments made
annually, given the evidence available for that year, a system that
approximates the existing effective term of marketing monopolies. A
longer period could be used, but periods too long may not be desirable,
given the high discount rates for the private investors.
Under the current system of incentives linked to marketing
monopolies, governments issue twenty-year patents on products, 3rocesses
or uses of products; exclusive rights in pharmaceutical test data ; orphan
product exclusive marketing protections; various sui generis programs to
extend patent terms; and other legal barriers to entry. Table 2 looks at the
current (February 2007) status of new molecular entities that were
approved for marketing by the United States FDA from 1990 to 2005.
Table 2
Status of competition: NMEs approved by FDA from 1990 to 2005

Orange Book Status as of February 2007
Year
FDA
approval
1990

of
Monopoly

Facing

seller

competition
27%

50%

Withdrawn
23%

Facing
competition

Year
on the

or withdrawn
50%

market
17

38. Judit Rius Sanjuan, James Love & Robert Weissman, Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data:
A Policy Proposal (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com
_content&task=view&id=86.
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1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2005
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20%
31%
52%
59%
67%
79%
56%
83%
80%
89%
100%
88%
95%
94%
92%

57%
42%
28%
14%
27%
13%
13%
7%
9%
7%
0%
0%
0%
3%
8%

23%
27%
20%
27%
7%
8%
31%
10%
11%
4%
0%
12%
5%
3%
0%

80%
69%
48%
41%
33%
21%
44%
17%
20%
11%
0%
12%
5%
6%
8%

41%
73%
93%

35%
13%
3%

24%
13%
4%

59%
27%
7%

Source: Julie Patel and Michael Palmedo, February 2007

F.

Size of the Prize Fund

The 2005 Sanders proposal would create a prize fund of 50 basis
points of United States GDP. Love's 2005 WHO publication on
remuneration for non-voluntary use of patents simulated a lower rate for
countries, starting with a top rate of 20 basis points for high-income
countries, and reducing that rate according to rankings on the United
39
Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") human development index.
Pogge's 2005 papers recommended a global prize fund of approximately
10 basis points of world GDP.
The size of a prize fund should be related to its objectives and seen in
the broader context of other efforts to fund R&D. If the prize fund were the
only source of R&D funding, it would have to be very large. If prizes
coexist with other instruments to finance R&D, such as patent monopolies,

39.

Base rate * (178 -rank of HDI)/177.

16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
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40
public sector R&D funding, employer contributions to research funds,
UNITAID-type global transactions taxes, or other sources, then the prize
fund might be smaller. Holding all other R&D funding options constant,
the larger the prize fund, the more investment it will stimulate.
In looking at the appropriate size of a prize fund, there are several
factual and policy issues that should be considered, including the current
levels and composition of investment in R&D for new medicines by the
public and private sector, the anticipated risk and profit premiums (discount
rates) for attracting private investment, and the opportunities for the public
sector to strategically subsidize some aspects of drug development costs,
such as for clinical trials. Governments will also be making implicit or
explicit assumptions about the elasticity of supply of improved health care
outcomes. To the degree that greater investments in R&D for new
medicines have high yields in terms of improved outcomes, they are
economically efficient and attractive uses of scarce resources.

G.

Valuation of Inventions

The government of Australia, a country with a population just over
twenty million persons, evaluates the "value" of medicines in order to set
reimbursements for its Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme ("PBS"). Other
governments do things that are quite similar. In the U.K., evaluation of
benefits is by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence ("NICE"). In
Australia, the U.K., Canada, New Zealand, and in many OECD countries,
governments are making decisions on the allowed reimbursement rates for
new medicines. The United States Congress is asking the United States
federal government to do the same. Private insurance companies also have
to decide if or how much they will reimburse medicines. Explicitly or
implicitly, these evaluations are based upon evidence of the
pharmoeconomic benefits of the products.
Logically, there is very little difference between determining the value
of a reimbursement and determining the value of a prize. If one can be
done, so can the other.
The basic tools for valuation are already at hand, filling volumes of
specialized journals, but there is room for considerable improvement,
particularly in terms of the evidence now collected from clinical trials.

40.

Love & Hubbard, Paying, supra note 2, at 219-23.
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H. Allocation of Set-Asides for Priorityor Neglected Areas
As described above, the Sanders bill recognizes that policy makers
want to address certain health problems, and that this extends to the
systems of stimulating R&D on new medicines. For example, in the United
States and Europe, special marketing exclusivity provisions are provided
for products with small markets (sometimes referred to as "orphan"
products following the United States' passage of the "Orphan Drug Act" in
1982). The Sanders bill created initial set-asides for three categories of
priority research:
* 4 percent for global neglected diseases;
* 10 percent for orphan drugs; and
* 4 percent for global infectious diseases and other global public
health priorities, including research on AIDS, AIDS vaccines, and
medicines for responding to bio-terrorism.
The bill allows the set-aside percentages to be modified by the board
that administers the prize fund.
I.

Treatment of Follow-on Innovation

One of the most important aspects of any incentive mechanism for
new medicines concerns the treatment of follow-on inventions. The most
risky investments and the most difficult science are often for the first
product in a therapeutic class. It is often not difficult to engineer around the
first product and introduce additional molecules that use similar
mechanisms for treatments. Moreover, the later products are often better
than the first in terms of efficacy or safety. Even when the differences are
small, for example, between Zocor and Lipitor, it may be rational to switch
patients to the newer product. This can radically reduce the market share of
the product that established the value of the approach. An incentive system
needs to provide incentives to both early movers and the follow-on
inventions that improve upon the early entrant. H.R. 417 addresses this
issue as follows:
In cases where a new drug, biological product, or manufacturing process
offers an improvement over an existing drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process and the new drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process competes with or replaces the existing drug,
biological product, or manufacturing process, the Board shall continue to
make prize payments for the existing drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process to the degree that the new drug, biological
product, or manufacturing process was based on or benefited from the
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development of the existing drug, biological product, or manufacturing
process.
In short, under H.R. 417 the prize payments for the new product will
reflect the incremental value of the improvements and the early entrant will
continue to receive prize payments even if its market share falls to zero.
J.

Transitionfrom Current to New System

The 2005 Sanders bill proposed an immediate transition to the new
system. In the first year, 90 percent of the prize payments would be given
to products already on the market. The share allocated to the older products
would be reduced by 9 percent each year.
V.

SOLVING THE GLOBAL FREE-RIDER ISSUE

The current global system for stimulating medical R&D relies
extensively on a complex and growing web of global trade agreements to
ensure minimum levels of intellectual property protection and, in some
cases, minimum prices for medicines. These include the WTO TRIPS
accord and the many bilateral and regional trade 42agreements that contain
provisions on intellectual property of drug pricing.
Global agreements that seek only to enhance the exclusive marketing
rights for medicines are highly imperfect instruments to address concerns
about the equitable distribution of the costs of medical R&D. These
obligations are focused not on R&D itself, but on the intermediate
measures that will influence drug prices. In practice, countries with very
similar systems of intellectual property protection often pay very different
amounts for medicine. In most countries, reimbursements for medicines are
tied to drug prices. Despite fairly similar intellectual property regimes, one
observes very different outcomes in terms of actual outlays among
developed economies, such as the United States, Canada, France, Germany,
Australia, Korea, and New Zealand. The same is true for developing
economies, where the different cultures, traditions, and levels of states'
support for reimbursing purchases of medicines lead to quite different
outcomes in countries like Kenya, India, South Africa, Brazil, Costa Rica,
the Philippines, and Thailand.
41. HR. 417, 109th Cong. § 9(d)(1) (2005).
42. Such as the 1999 U.S./Korea and E.C./Korea agreements, and the more recent efforts by the
E.C. to set minimum reimbursements in Turkey, or the United States efforts to undermine price
negotiations or increase reimbursements in Australia, Malaysia, Canada, Germany, Thailand, and
elsewhere.
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To the extent that the current global framework does increase global
outlays in patented medicines, it is quite inefficient, raising global outlays
from $400 to $500 billion in 2005, for only $51 billion in private sector
outlays on R&D, little of which was invested in products that were
medically important. High drug prices have created a pervasive and
harmful culture of rationing medicines, as evidenced by the paucity of
patented medicines on the WHO essential drugs list, and the extensive
efforts by governments and private insurance companies to justify limiting
reimbursements for new medicines.
The current global framework also completely ignores global
obligations to support investments in basic research, public goods like the
Human Genome Project, investments in emerging public health threats,
high risk translational research, diseases that primarily afflict poor people
living in poor countries, or the types of clinical trials that would best
evaluate the benefits and risks of existing medicines.
A shift from prices to prizes would require a new global framework to
address the. legitimate problems of sharing the costs of research and
development for new products. The proposal to the WHO in February 2005
was one effort to address this issue. It presented a global framework that
recognized the importance of both public and private sector investments in
R&D, and it offered a framework for obligations and incentives to invest in
projects and areas of public interest. The new global framework focuses on
R&D directly, rather than the flawed mechanisms of high drug prices. It is
entirely consistent with a shift from prices to prizes as the primary "pull"
mechanism to stimulate medical R&D.
VI. COMPARISON OF THE PRIZE FUND APPROACH TO ADVANCED
PURCHASE COMMITMENTS OR ADVANCED MARKETING COMMITMENTS

While prize mechanisms are beginning to attract more attention, in
some circles a related but somewhat different approach is better known.
Largely because of the effective advocacy of Michael Kremer and Jeffrey
Sachs, and the support from Bill Gates and large pharmaceutical
companies, there has been considerable work to explore the possible role of
"advanced purchase commitments" ("APCs") or "advanced marketing
commitments" ("AMCs"). First proposed by Kremer and Sachs as
mechanisms for stimulating "greenfield" R&D on new vaccines for malaria
and other illnesses of the poor, APCs and AMCs are now largely discussed
in the context of "late stage" R&D on products that are already far into the
pipeline.
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The APC and AMC approaches both embrace the notion that prices
should continue to be the main signal for investors, even when patients are
poor. The approaches do not change the nature of price-sensitive
formularies. They do not move toward a world where the prices of
innovation are zero on the margin. They do make a political statement: the
price system works well when you have enough money to pay for it.
The most appealing argument in favor of the APC/AMC approach is
that it links the R&D incentive to the delivery of the products to patients.
However, there is no reason why a prize would not do the same thing, so
long as prizes reward actual outcomes. In important ways, prizes would
create more sustainable systems of finance. In the APC/AMC approach,
governments or donors would spend large sums of money, billions of
dollars in many proposals, to buy products at high prices and then deliver
them to the poor. The developer of the products has no obligation to
transfer the invention to the public domain and, indeed, no incentive to
develop products that are particularly inexpensive to manufacture. When
the APC/AMC payments stop, or even before they begin, the developer can
charge whatever it wants, assisted by the fact that the governments or
donors have deliberately established a high price.
The APC/AMC approach requires a specification of the products
eligible for purchases. In some versions, the prices are determined before
the products are fully developed. This feature of the APC/AMC approach
creates considerable problems, as governments and donors are expected to
anticipate technologies best suited to the health care objectives and the
prices that will stimulate development of such technologies. This
introduces the need for considerable information and judgment, as well as
presents the possibility that the APC/AMC approach will be tailored for
specific companies, just as a job description can be designed for a single
applicant.
For many of these reasons, advocates of the APC/AMC approach have
moved away from assertions that the mechanism should use "greenfield"
R&D ventures, and now propose that the focus be placed on "late stage"
R&D projects. How "late" would that be? If products are indeed "fully
cooked" and ready for commercialization, the APC/AMC becomes simply
a negotiation over a price in a procurement. If the APC/AMC approach is
too early, it risks the inefficiencies associated with similar central planning
exercises. The prize fund approach would suffer from these same problems
if it is too closely tied to a special technological standard, and to a lesser
but important extent, if tied to a narrow disease category.
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Hubbard/Love, Hollis, Pogge, Sanders, Weisbrod, and some others
have advocated an approach that is not tied to technology standards, but
rather to improved health outcomes themselves, leaving the question of the
technology to the developer. We all have proposed systems that are quite
broad in terms of disease coverage. In our view, the objectives of the
APC/AMC approach would be better served by a system of prizes. A
system of prizes would create or enhance the incentives for R&D that lead
to better health outcomes, with the benefit of providing incentives to create
products for which the costs of manufacturing and delivery are minimized.
Also, if the prizes are implemented within a fixed budget (as is advocated
by Hubbard/Love, Hollis, and Sanders), it would ensure that products
would benefit from marginal cost pricing.
VII. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION'S INTERNATIONAL WORKING
GROUP ON PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.

In May 2006, the World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA
59.24, which created a new Intergovernmental Working Group on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (referred to by the WHO
internally as PHI/IGWG). This resolution combined two resolutions, one
that concerned the recently completed report of CIPIH, and another
concerning a "Global Framework on Essential Health Research and
Development" that had been first sponsored by Kenya on November 16,
2005, and later co-sponsored by Brazil.
Under WHA 59.24, the WHA decided
to establish, in accordance with Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure of the
World Health Assembly, an intergovernmental working group open to all
interested Member States to draw up a global strategy and plan of action
in order to provide a medium-term framework based on the
recommendations of the Commission. Such a strategy and plan of action
aims at, inter alia, securing an enhanced and sustainable basis for needsdriven, essential health research and development relevant to diseases
that disproportionately affect developing countries, proposing clear
objectives and priorities fI research and development, and estimating
funding needs in this area.
The first meeting of the PHIIIGWG took place in December 2006. In
February 2006, Bangladesh and Bolivia submitted papers to the PHI/IGWG
calling for consideration of new methods of stimulating investments in
43. Public Health, Innovation, Essential Health Research and Intellectual Property Rights:
Towards a Global Strategy and Plan of Action, WHA59.24 (May 27, 2006), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA59/A59_R24-en.pdf.

20071

THE BIG IDEA

medical R&D, including the use of prizes. The Bangladesh submission
said,
We note with great interest a shift in the global policy discussion, away
from the status quo of TRIPS compliant patent regimes for medicines
and toward new models for rewarding innovation, such as prize funds.
The prize fund model separates the incentives for innovation from the
prices of medicines. Innovation would be rewarded directly from
nationally, regionally or globally managed prize funds based on
improvements in health care outcomes, while ensuring low prices for
medicV4 innovations from generic competition immediately upon market
entry.
The Bolivian submission echoed these themes, calling for the delinking of R&D incentives from the prices of products, and called for the
PHI/IGWG to evaluate the plausibility of creating a new system of prizes
to reward development of essential medicines that improve health care
outcomes:
Desvincular precios de los incentivos a la investigaci6n y desarrollo
(I+D)
Un numero creciente de economistas, expertos en salud, y empresas del
sector privado estdn examinando los beneficios de cambiar la naturaleza
de los incentivos privados para la investigaci6n y desarrollo, para que no
se vinculen a los precios de los medicamentos. Destacamos en particular
el trabajo sobre premios (recompensas) de Tim Hubbard, James Love,
Aidan Hollis, Thomas Pogge, y Joseph Stiglitz.
Sugerimos al IGWG evaluar la factibilidad de la creaci6n de un sistema
nuevo de premios para recompensar el desarrollo de medicamentos
esenciales. Estos pjmios podrian recompensar las invenciones que
mejoren las resultas.
The PHI/IGWG is focusing on new approaches to R&D for Type II
and III diseases. The position of the large pharmaceutical industry has
recently become more receptive to the consideration of prizes in this area.
For example, in a January 11-12 meeting in New York on "Overcoming the
gaps in TB drug development," organized by MSF, the meeting
participants adopted this statement on support for new approaches to R&D.
The TB community must engage in the World Health Organization's
Intergovernmental Working Group on Innovation, Intellectual Property
and Public Health to establish a global R&D framework to help design
44. Submission by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh to the WHO's Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and
Intellectual
Property
Rights (Feb.
28, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/phi/
submissions/BangladeshlGWGsubmissionMar-07.pdf.
45. Organizaci6n Mundial de la Salud: Grupo de Trabajo Intergubemamental sobre Salud Pfiblica,
lnnovaci6n y Propiedad Intelectual (Mar. I, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/phi/submissions
/Bolivia CommentsIGWGl_5.pdf.
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new ways of setting R&D priorities and financing. With respect to TB
drug development, participants of the New York symposium support
current discussion at the WHO for a treaty on essential health R&D that
addresses the question of who pays for essential medical R&D and delinks incentives from drug prices, instead 'rwarding the impact of
inventions accordingto health care outcomes.

The New York statement on R&D was supported by the industry
participants in the event. A representative from Novartis attending the
event said that the current incentive systems do not work for diseases like
TB, and that they were willing to look at alternatives, a view later shared
by a representative from the IFPMA in a Geneva event on intellectual
property rights and access to medicine, and echoed privately by a number
of industry officials. These industry officials are unwilling, however, to
endorse the prize model as the primary mechanism to support R&D for
Type I diseases.
VIII.

PRIZES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRICE DISCRIMINATION FOR
PRODUCTS

Some critics of prizes have suggested that forms of price
discrimination are a preferred method to promote access, because they are
less disruptive of the current paradigms. However, price discrimination
approaches can be difficult to implement in practice, often yield
unsatisfactory results, and present conflicts with other policy objectives,
such as the free movement of goods.
Price discrimination in medicines and vaccines is already persuasive.
United States consumers generally pay more for patented pharmaceutical
products than do consumers in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or Europe.
Consumers in the Philippines generally pay higher prices for medicines
than do consumers in Thailand. Prices in northern European countries
historically have been higher than prices in southern European countries.
Prices are quite different from country to country, and also within
countries. Some of the price differences have nothing to do with the ability
to pay. 47 For example, uninsured patients in the United States lack the
ability to bargain, and often pay higher prices than do patients that have
insurance, despite their lesser ability to pay. Because of inefficient

46. Mrdecins Sans Frontirres, Conference Statement, NO TIME TO WAIT: Overcoming the
Gaps in TB Drug Development (Jan. 15, 2007); Press Release, Tuberculosis Experts Outline Proposals
to Speed Up Drug Development (Jan. 12, 2007).
47. See, for example, the many examples in Gelders et al., supra note 12.
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distribution systems, consumers in Indonesia pay higher prices for generic
antibiotics than do consumers in Canada.
In other cases, price discrimination is a rough but imperfect effort to
extract higher prices from different classes of consumers. An example of
this would be the two tiers of pricing of medicines between the public and
private sector in some countries. But price discrimination is plagued with
problems. It is difficult to monitor the ability of different groups to pay for
medicines, and often companies simply target the highest price consumers.
In developing countries, it is often the case that products are priced to sell
to only the wealthiest 5 to 20 percent of consumers. The putative rationale
for such policies is that it is costly if not impossible to prevent the rich from
buying lower priced products that are affordable for the poor. The same
argument is made with regard to pricing of products between rich and poor
countries. Even information about price differences can lead to indirect
price controls, through reference price mechanisms, for example, not to
mention the theoretical possibility of parallel trade between countries.
One area where price discrimination is being severely challenged is in
the European Union. Today there are twenty-seven member states in the
European Union. Incomes between states are quite different. The average
per capita income for these countries was $26,460 in 2004. Ten member
states with a population of more than one hundred million persons have
average incomes that are less than half of this. The European Union is now
struggling with a dilemma. The policy of a unified market is creating huge
problems for access to medicines within Europe.
Table 3
Population in
GDP/POP $
millions
EU Member State
3,090
7.8
Bulgaria
3,358
21.8
Romania
5,913
2.3
Latvia
6,277
38.6
Poland
6,559
3.4
Lithuania
7,611
5.4
Slovakia
8,615
1.3
Estonia
9,970
10.1
Hungary
10,490
10.2
Czech Republic
13,250
0.4
Malta
16,100
2.0
Slovenia
16,125
10.4
Portugal
18,486
11.1
Greece
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Cyprus
Spain
Italy
Germany
Belgium
France
Austria
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
Ireland
Denmark
Luxembourg

0.8
42.6
58.0
82.6
10.4
60.3
8.2
59.5
16.2
5.2
9.0
4.1
5.4
0.5
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19,250
24,411
28,928
33,179
33,875
33,940
35,646
35,704
35,741
35,750
38,489
44,293
44,704
63,800

A switch from prices to prizes would allow the members of the
European Union to reconcile the need for incentives for new drug
development with access to medicine and the EU policy of a single market
for the products. Prizes would be a particularly appropriate paradigm for
Europe, where governments and employers already are providing extensive
social insurance for pharmaceutical products, prices are already often
determined by negotiations, and the free movement of goods is a core
value. A system of prizes for Europe would also help address the troubling
movement toward rationing for new medicines, particularly for the most
expensive new medicines for severe illnesses.
This is also true in the larger global market, where the problems of
limiting parallel trade and other diversions of medicines are making it more
difficult to consider price discrimination as a viable strategy to protect
consumers and promote access.
IX. INCREMENTAL OR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM?
There are two assumptions implicit in proposals that consider prize
mechanisms only as special and limited programs to deal with areas of
complete market failure, such as neglected diseases or sales to populations
with almost no ability to pay. One is that the current system is functioning
reasonably well, and it would not be prudent to change without more
evidence that the alternative would work. The second is that it is politically
difficult, if not impossible, to introduce a radical change in the way that
R&D is financed for Type I diseases or for high-income markets, given the
political power of the incumbent pharmaceutical companies. While we
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support even limited efforts to experiment with the use of prizes to
stimulate medical R&D, including those being considered today by the
WHO's IGWG on Public Health, Intellectual Property and Innovation, we
have considered and rejected both assumptions against a broader and more
radical reform.
Tying the incentive for R&D to the price of products fundamentally
flaws the current system of financing R&D for new medicines. It has led to
appalling disparities of access to medicines, well-known pricing abuses in
both high- and low-income countries, massive waste in terms of excessive
marketing of products and investments in medically unimportant products,
and under-investment in products that have the greatest medical benefits.
Prices for new medicines treating severe illnesses are very aggressive,
which leads to increasing rationing of access, even in high-income
countries. The existence of high prices in the United States and other highincome countries is leading to enormous pressures on other countries to
accept high prices, through such measures as new intellectual property
norms, exercised both formally and informally.
The intellectual property norms incorporated into the 1995 WTO
TRIPS agreement were at the time considered to be quite tough. WTO
members were obligated to provide twenty-year patents on pharmaceutical
products and to abide by a set of rules when using compulsory licensing or
other exceptions to patent rights. However, subsequent analysis and debate
over the TRIPS agreement has shown that TRIPS itself can be a fairly
flexible instrument if WTO members are willing to use the various
exceptions and limitations to rights that are allowed in the agreement.
These flexibilities include the ability to grant non-remunerative exceptions
to patent rights in certain cases, to embrace relatively high standards for
patentability, and to grant non-voluntary authorizations to use patents,
subject to "adequate" remuneration.
Even before the TRIPS agreement came into force, the United States
and other high-income countries sought a number of new bilateral, regional
and multilateral agreements on intellectual property rights and drug pricing
that go far beyond the 1995 TRIPS obligations. The Clinton Administration
continued an aggressive "TRIPS plus" trade policy that was not modified
until AIDS activists aggressively disrupted the presidential campaign of Al
Gore in 1999. 48 The United States' trade policy was then somewhat
48. Bob Davis, Gore Hopes New AIDS Pact Will Help Shake Protesters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,
1999. For a personal account, see Mark Milano, Personal Perspective: Zapping for Drugs, ACRIA
UPDATE, Fall 2006, available at http://www.thebody.com/cria/fall06/zapping.html?m 172o.
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moderated, with formal changes announced by President Clinton on
December 1, 1999, 4 9 followed by an executive order on AIDS and subSaharan Africa in May 2000.50 But as important as the changes in policy
were, they were fairly limited and in practice did not extend greatly beyond
policies relating to a single disease, AIDS, and were limited when applied
even to AIDS outside of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, President
Clinton's trade team negotiated a 1999 agreement with Korea setting
mandatory minimum price reimbursements for innovative medicines (the
A-7 pricing agreement), and a 2000 FTA agreement with Jordan that
dramatically narrowed the grounds under which Jordan could issue
compulsory licenses on patents, as well as the protection of pharmaceutical
test data and other provisions.
The 2000 United States Trade Representative 301 Report to Congress
was the first to abide by the new program to address public health
concerns. While it had been moderated, it still contained a number of
citations for inadequate intellectual property protection of medicines,
including complaints about failures to adopt intellectual property
protections of pharmaceutical test data that go beyond WTO TRIPS
obligations for Argentina, Chile, Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Uruguay. On January 9, 2001, days before leaving
office, President Clinton asked the WTO to bring trade sanctions against
Brazil for a compulsory licensing statute, at a time when Brazil was
considering issuing5 1a compulsory license for the patents on the AIDS drug
efavirenz ("EFV").
President Bush took office initially sympathetic to some measures to
balance trade polices on intellectual property protection, notably by
deciding to keep the Clinton Executive Order on AIDS and Africa, and by
participating constructively in the 2001 WTO negotiations that led to the
widely praised Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. But by
2002, extensive lobbying and vast campaign contributions by the
pharmaceutical industry led to changes in trade policy and were followed
by the launching of a plethora of new bilateral and regional trade
negotiations that sought tough TRIPS-plus measures, as well as new trade

49. Press Release, President Clinton Announces New Cooperative Effort to Help Poor Countries
Gain Access to Affordable Medicines, Including for HIV/AIDS Treatment (Dec. 1, 1999), available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/WTO-Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-01 2.html.
50. Exec. Order No. 13155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 12, 2000); Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Issues
Orderto Ease Availability ofAIDS Drugs in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000.
51. Brazil-MeasuresAffecting PatentProtection, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the
United States, WT/DS 199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001).
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agreements on drug pricing. The European Union and other high-income
countries also pursued similar agreements.
Perhaps much more important than the formal agreements are the armtwisting and pressuring of countries to prevent them from using the
flexibilities existing in both the TRIPS and the new TRIPS-plus trade
measures. In addition to the enormous power of the various threats and
efforts to link pharmaceutical policies to broader trade and foreign policy
considerations, countries north and south, faced considerable in-country
lobbying by pharmaceutical companies and consistently inaccurate, biased,
and pro-industry press coverage and academic commentary, which created
effective soft norms against the use of TRIPS flexibilities or effective price
controls. Even aggressive price negotiations are branded as "piracy" and
theft of intellectual property. The most recent example of this dynamic is
the bitter debate over the recent decision by Thailand to issue compulsory
licenses on medicines for AIDS and heart disease.
Without a more fundamental reform in developed economies, it is
unlikely that poor people in developing countries will be allowed to use the
existing flexibilities in trade agreements. In this sense, the more radical
reforms may be needed for a sustainable solution to the global problem of
access.
CONCLUSION

In this article we have argued that it is possible to construct a viable
new system to finance innovation in a way that maximizes access to new
inventions while continuing to exploit commercial competitive market
incentive mechanisms.
The prize mechanisms should be thought of as part of a larger
ecosystem of financing medical R&D and should be implemented in
combination with other instruments, such as direct or indirect government
funding of basic research, non-profit product development partnerships
(PDPs), clinical trials, and other traditional and non-traditional types of
funding R&D. What the prizes offer uniquely is an alternative to the
marketing monopoly as an incentive for private investment.
When implemented properly, prize based models can directly reward
successful R&D projects, while permitting marginal cost pricing of
products and avoiding the trap of overly bureaucratic and centralized
decision-making. By decoupling the rewards for successful R&D
investment from the sales of products, the new model will permit
governments to create more efficient and useful incentives for R&D that
focus on inventions that improve health outcomes.
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Prize mechanisms can be implemented in ways that are consistent
with a robust patent system, but are best implemented in systems where the
patent system is used to establish ownership of inventions and thus claims
on the prize rewards, rather than through exclusive rights to market
products. It is important that those incentives are linked to broad research
priorities, and not be overly prescriptive in terms of diseases, mechanisms
or technologies. By eliminating marketing monopolies on products, there is
an opportunity for much greater efficiency through unrestricted
competition to manufacture the resulting medical products.
The elimination of marketing monopolies, the de-coupling of R&D
incentives from prices, and the creation of an evidence-based reward
system linked to changes in health outcomes will lead to significant
reductions in expenditures to market products, the area of the largest waste
in the current system.
It is important that the total obligations to finance the reward payment
are not directly tied to utilization, but rather measures of a country's ability
to contribute to global R&D costs, so that countries do not have incentives
to limit access to products in order to control budget outlays on innovation
rewards.
Prize mechanisms can be introduced in areas where the markets are
functioning the poorest, such as for diseases that primarily affect poor
people living in poor countries. But the largest benefit will come from the
adoption of prize mechanisms in higher-income markets, such as the
United States, both because improvements in the efficiency of R&D
incentives in high-income countries are important for the development of
medicines used everywhere, and also because pricing norms in highincome countries are forcefully exported to developing countries, creating
enormous hardships.
Whilst additional detailed modeling will be required to improve
reward structures and evaluation criteria, these efforts are feasible and not
materially different from efforts by governments or insurance companies to
determine acceptable reimbursements for insured products.
A significant shift to a new system of incentives that relies upon prizes
rather than prices will also require a shift to a new global trade framework
that focuses less on intellectual property rights and more on country
contributions to mechanisms that support R&D, including but not limited to
prize incentive mechanisms.
The major challenge to switching financing systems for medical
innovation on a global scale depends on whether there is sufficient political
leadership.

